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TURKEY: SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF URBAN VIOLENCE

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
8 May 1981

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1747

### TURKEY: SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY OF URBAN VIOLENCE

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 6-8 Apr 81 pp 7,8



The Level of Modern Civilization

[6 Apr 61, pp 7-8]

[Text]

## Introduction

We embarked on our study in the autumn of 1979 with the hypothesis that the phenomenon of uncontrolled and unsound urbanization in Turkey is not the only factor but an important one in the germination, intensification, and dissemination of acts of political violence. It is apparent that terrorist acts--familiar in Turkey as "anarchic incidents," which in actuality reflect the crumbling of state authority, the gradual breakdown of communication between governed and government, and, as a result, speeded societal disintegration--have shown a major decrease, particularly from 12 September to the present.

Everyone agrees that the advances made in the war against terrorism during this brief period have relied heavily on a rejuvenated government, impartial administration, the continually effective efforts of security forces, and a closer cooperation between the people and government officials in the arrest of terrorists.

But, the arrest and imprisonment of tens and hundreds of terrorists, the dissuasion of a great majority of their sympathizers, and, along with this, the preference of a portion of the activists to lie low until civilian government returns cannot be interpreted to mean that violence has been stymied or that it will never again be seen in Turkey. As a matter of fact, if social conditions are not borne in mind, a policy aimed only at prosecuting the guilty--despite all its successes in the short term--will not be enough to ensure the success desired in the long run. In other words, it is mandatory that we discern the structural sources of terrorism in our country.

In a Turkey whose population had doubled in the last 30 years, it is a fact that as rural population has declined from 82 percent to a current 55 percent owing to gradually accelerating internal emigration, the needs of our urban citizens and those moving to the city everyday with great expectations, cannot be easily met with respect to work, housing, transportation, schools, hospitals, minimum wage, social security, etc. Although a cause and effect relationship cannot be directly established between deferred gratification and violence, it does follow that negative aspects of traditional culture inherited from the rural social environment make themselves particularly evident in the second generation which can in no way be integrated with the city, which is gradually being divested of its productivity under the impact of a nearly 10-year general economic crisis. Therefore, the deprivation that is sparking a widening gulf between the hopes and actual circumstances of urban masses must be kept in mind before distinguishing veteran urbanites from new comers. Moreover, it is obvious that obstructions in the social mechanism since the 1970's and talk of "self-aggrandizement" have greatly shaken the people's trust in the system.

In short, a state whose parliament, government, and every political institution is "deadlocked" and which gradually loses its viability cannot resolve this socio-economic malaise with limited economic, social, and political resources that it cannot provide to a major segment of its citizens. Quite the contrary, it exacerbates regression. It is for these reasons that hope of extrication could easily turn in places to an armed hope this time directed from inside and outside the country.

The effective course adopted by government forces against dens of terror has yielded concrete results. But, in our view, the existence of a strong central authority is not enough in itself to secure social tranquility. There must be a genuinely viable libertarian political system grounded in democratic social justice that grants freedom of expression to all sectors of society and distributes equally to all sectors the burdens of economic development. Yet, there is nothing new in this. For example, 9 centuries ago, Yusuf Has Hacib, the author of the KUTADGUBILIG, gave the following advice to his Lord regarding what the people expected from their ruler: 1) Caravan routes must be protected; 2) silver is not to be devaluated; 3) good laws should be promulgated. We believe that public order, a strong economy, and the requisite justice and realism are points all leaders must constantly bear in mind.

Social tranquility exists to the degree that urban citizens--who at least rent a place with their families, have regular jobs and incomes, the means for just a little relaxation and diversion, and the opportunity for democratic political participation--and the "younger generations"--whose numbers are on the rise and participating in the urbanization process--can be channeled into positive endeavors, thereby ensuring their futures.

The sole aim of this modest work we began in the tumultuous pre-September milieu was to draw attention to the negative impact of unsound urbanization upon the phenomenon of political violence. Holding the same conviction today, we thought it useful to present to the general readership at this time part of our findings and personal assessments that we will compile into a future book. We will consider ourselves fortunate if we make a small contribution to the efforts begun in our country to shed light on the phenomenon of terrorism. In this connection, we wish to express our gratitude for the crucial help given us by Social Sciences Faculty assistant Serhan Ada, who undertook searches through the press, and to the director of the Middle East Technical University Information Processing Center and his experts for analyzing the data.

Prof Dr Rusen Keles  
Asst Prof Dr Artun Unsal  
(Social Sciences Faculty members)

## I

We do not regard the big-city phenomenon as the basic cause of violence. However, we do say that an unsound urbanization process provides an environment conducive to political violence, being a "variable that further aids and facilitates" such violence. Again, we oppose the fact that the urban phenomenon is "being labeled the basic cause for deviation from social norms." Using this view as a point of departure, we thought that an analysis would be pertinent that encompasses certain large cities in Turkey that are both major urban centers and located in various regions of the country. Cities imbued with these characteristics are Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Bursa, and Gaziantep. The nature of violence in these cities and their environs provided us certain clues.

Therefore, incidents and the like that occurred in these cities between 1975 and 1979 can be studied through newspaper searches. When the data obtained from this in-depth research--excluding incidents of ordinary violence--is analyzed in conjunction with various characteristics common to these cities, it can be

hypothesized that a partial link will emerge between unsound urbanization and political violence and terrorism. Despite all the relative development of Istanbul, which reached 5 million people in the 1980 census and, by itself, is home to 12 percent of Turkey's populace, everyone would readily agree that Istanbul is an example of unsound urbanization. It is clear that within the general category of political violence there is a broad "spectrum of action" ranging from distribution of pamphlets to murder. When, as part of the spectrum, we consider murder, which generates the greatest public tension, we see that Istanbul is front runner among the various provinces. For example, it is evident from the data of YANKI magazine concerning murders in Turkey over a 9-month period from November 1979 to July 1980--during which violent crime peaked--that Istanbul accounted for 29 percent of all murders. Yet, it is known that Istanbul proper contains only 6.6 percent of Turkey's populace. The following is a table that compares by month violent deaths in Istanbul province and Turkey in general.

Aylar <sup>a</sup>	Istanbul'da <sup>b</sup> Ölümler	Türkiye'de <sup>c</sup> Ölümler	Istanbul'un <sup>d</sup> Oranı
Kasım 1979	37	100	27.0
Aralık 1979	55	169	32.3
Ocak 1980	41	120	34.2
Şubat 1980	66	146	43.2
Mart 1980	43	178	24.2
Nisan 1980	55	216	25.5
Mayıs 1980	48	184	26.1
Haziran 1980	62	218	28.4
Temmuz 1980	93	322	23.8
Toplam: <sup>f</sup>	480	1853	100.0

- Key: a) months (November 1979-July 1980)  
b) deaths in Istanbul  
c) deaths in Turkey  
d) Istanbul percentage  
e) November 1979-July 1980  
f) total

As can be seen from the above table, an average of 53 persons were killed a month in Istanbul (28.9 percent) during this 9-month period while an average of 183 lives were lost a month in all Turkey. In a review of newspapers between 1975 and 1979, we see that in the distribution of 2300 acts of violence--including murder--in the provinces that contain our 6 major cities, Istanbul tops the list.

#### Distribution of Violence by Province (1975-1979)

##### ŞİDDET OLAYLARININ İLLERE DAĞILIŞI (1975-1979)

İller <sup>a</sup>	Şiddetli Olay Sayısı <sup>b</sup>	Toplamda Oranı (Yüzde) <sup>c</sup>
Istanbul	844	41.0
Ankara	815	35.4
İzmir	177	7.8
Adana	160	7.0
Bursa	45	2.2
Gaziantep	157	6.8
Toplam <sup>d</sup>	2300	100.0

- Key: a) provinces  
b) number of incidents  
c) percentage  
d) total



It is evident in this comparison based on urban center and district center populations that Istanbul, which is home to 34.8 percent of the urban population in the 6 provinces, was the staging ground for 41.0 percent of violent incidents. It is significant that in Ankara and, to a degree, in Gaziantep the percentage of incidents exceeds the percentage of urban population.

Yet, it is known that the problem of security in Istanbul, where violence is the most concentrated, has reached highly significant dimensions. For example, the total number of officers in the Istanbul police apparatus has been put at 8097 (of these 66 are police chiefs, 38 are police captains, 346 are chief superintendents, 54 are superintendents, 194 are assistant superintendents, and 7399 are policemen).

What types of violence have occurred in Istanbul? Where are the incidents concentrated? Who and what institutions are being targeted in these acts committed by "unidentified persons"? Because violence perpetrated by individuals appears in the press only after a certain period of time has passed, we have been unable to obtain adequate data on activists' identities. Nonetheless, we have deemed it useful to provide in future, as a supplement to our research for the years 1975 through 1979, data contained in the press and uncertain limited research as well as official statements dealing with individual characteristics of activists involved in violence in Istanbul and in certain other major cities, and who were later arrested or convicted.

#### Job Applicants and Placement in Istanbul

#### ISTANBUL'DA İŞ İÇİN BAŞVURANLAR VE İŞE YERLEŞTİRİLEBİLENLER

a Yıllar	b Başvuru Sayısı (000 kişi)	İşe Yerleştirilen		dYüzde
		c İşçi Sayısı (000 kişi)		
1971	62	20		31.7
1972	51	19		37.3
1973	46	18		39.0
1974	68	18		26.6
1975	71	16		22.2
1976	86	13		15.3
1977	85	10		11.8
1978	96	9		9.0

- Key: a) years  
b) number of applicants (in thousands)  
c) number placed (in thousands)  
d) percentage

Job opportunities in Istanbul are continually declining...It is evident from the above table that the number of job applicants is constantly increasing while placement is declining. In 1971, 62,000 persons wanted jobs; only 20,000 were placed. In 1980, only 9,000 of 96,000 applicants could be placed.

#### Type of Incident

Those incidents of violence found most frequently in Istanbul include armed assault and bombing, bank and business robberies, armed clashes, and assorted demonstrations, obstructions, active resistance, and the like in educational institutions. The following table shows the distribution of incidents by type during the period 1975-1979.

## Types of Violence in Istanbul (1975-1979)

### İSTANBUL'DA ŞİDDET OLAYLARININ TÜRLERİ (1975-1979)

Olay Türü a	b Sayı	c Oran (%)
Saldırı (bombalı, silahlı) d	621	45.7
Soygun (Banka ve işyeri, araç) e	137	10.0
Silahlı çatışma f	87	6.3
Direniş, boykot, miting vb. g	45	3.3
Yangın çıkarma, kundaklama veya protesto h	35	2.5
Taşlı sopalı kavga i	19	1.4
Cemaevi olayı, kaçma, ırsan j	4	0.3
Gemi kaçırma k	3	0.2
Adam kaçırma l	3	0.2
Tehdit, zorla para alma m	3	0.2
<b>Toplam n</b>	<b>944</b>	<b>100.0</b>

- Key: a) type of incident      h) arson  
 b) number      i) rock, club fight  
 c) percentage      j) prison incident, escape, riot  
 d) assault (armed, bomb)      k) seajacking  
 e) robbery (bank, business, vehicle)      l) kidnapping  
 f) armed clash      m) blackmail, extortion  
 g) active resistance, boycott, rally, etc.      n) total

Compiled from violent incidents reported in the press, this table only covers a 5-year period. Nonetheless, it demonstrates a marked rise, particularly in 1980, in certain types of incidents in Istanbul such as blackmail, extortion, and forced business closures.

### Istanbul Income Distribution by City District (1980)

#### İSTANBUL'DA SEMTLERE GÖRE GELİR DAĞILIMI (1980)

a	b	c	d	e
Semt Grupları	Aile Nüfusu (kişi)	Geçirilen Aile (kişi)	Aylık Aile Geliri (TL.)	Kişi Başına Ortalama Gelir (TL.)
Etlik, Levent, Yeşilyurt	2.2	1.1	50.963	23.114
Snatya, Fenerbahçe, Bakırköy	2.8	1.1	33.533	11.971
Ümraniye, İçerenköy, Gaziosmanpaşa	3.3	2.1	7.023	1.323
<b>f Ortalama</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>30.437</b>	<b>11.805</b>

- Key: a) district groupings  
 b) family size  
 c) individuals with income  
 d) monthly family income (TL)  
 e) average personal income (TL)  
 f) average



Since 40 percent of Istanbul's residents receive 90 percent of all income, the other 60 percent must be content with the remaining 10 percent. The above table reveals the skewed income distribution between three structurally distinct district groupings.

#### Location of Incident

The following table shows that although violence is on the prowl day and night in the city streets, incidents occurring in educational institutions--generally characterized as "anarchy's cradle"--are secondary. It draws attention to the fact that attacks directed particularly against residences and businesses are stressed by activists when terrorizing the masses. On the other hand, an interesting point is that despite a myriad of strikes and active resistance in Istanbul factories during these 5 years, one finds very few examples that could be categorized as incidents of violence.

#### Locations of Violence in Istanbul (1975-1979)

İSTANBUL'DA ŞİDDET OLAYLARININ YERLERİ: (1975-1979)		
Olay yeri a	b Sayı	Oran (yüzde)
Sokak (Durak, istasyon, otogar, havaalanı, iskele dahil) d	373	39.4
İşyeri (Ticaretخانه, benzin istasyonu, otel) depo vb. dahil) e	128	13.3
Üniversite, akademi ve yüksek okul (Yurt, kantin dahil) f	92	9.7
Banka g	78	8.0
Konut h	74	7.8
Siyasal parti, dernek, sendika spor kulübü i	56	5.9
Kahve j	49	5.2
Okul (Lise, orta) k	39	4.1
Resmî yapılar (Belediye, cezaevi, karakol) l	28	3.0
Taşıtlar (Otobüs, tren, gemi vb.) m	18	1.9
Lokanta, pastahane, dyatro, sinema n	11	1.2
Koruluk orman, kırsal o	6	0.6
Fabrika p	4	0.4
Yabancı ülke temsilciliği q	3	0.3
Cami r	1	0.1
s Toplam	944	100

- Key:
- a) location
  - b) number
  - c) percentage
  - d) street (stop, station, garage, airport, wharf)
  - e) workplace (businesses, gas station, hotel, depot, etc.)
  - f) university, academy, advanced institution (including dormitory, cafeteria)
  - g) bank
  - h) residence
  - i) political party, association, union, sport club
  - j) coffeehouse
  - k) school (high, intermediate)
  - l) official building (municipal, prison, police station)
  - m) transportation (bus, train, ship, etc.)
  - n) restaurant, bakery, theater, moviehouse
  - o) wooded area, forest, countryside
  - p) factory
  - q) foreign representation
  - r) mosque
  - s) total

[7 Apr 81, p 8]

[Text]

## II

We have been able to obtain data on the identities of individuals who were generally the targets of violence only so far as such information was available in the press. As we stated at the outset, the fact that a very large segment of activists was not arrested by security forces until the end of 1979 has compelled us to go to some additional sources outside our original research. It is clear, however, that these sources are not suitable for the purpose of making generalizations.

### The Victims

Generally there was no way most of the time to obtain detailed information on the identities of victims reported in the press as having fallen to incidents of violence. In fact, we could find evidence regarding identity and political persuasion in only 250 out of 944 incidents of violence that we pinpointed. The following table shows the victims of violence with students, workers, employers, and security officials heading the list.

#### Distribution of Victims by Occupation

#### KURBANLARIN MESLEKLERINE GÖRE DAĞILIMI

MESLEKLER a	b SAYI	c ORAN (%)
Öğrenci	63	25.2
Orta öğrenim ve benzeri .... 19		
Üniversite ... .. 17 d		
Yüksek okul ... .. 15		
Eğitim Enstitüsü ... .. 8		
İşçi ... .. 48		19.2
Tüccar, sanayici, esnaf vb. ... .. 36		14.4
Güvenlik görevlisi (Polis, bekçi, er) ... .. 29		8.4
Yoldan gelip geçen ... .. 18		7.2
Öğretmen ... .. 14		5.6
Üniversite öğretim üyesi ... .. 12		4.8
Küçük memur ... .. 12		4.8
Siyasal parti, dernek, sendika üye veya yöneticisi ... .. 11		4.4
Serbest meslek (Doktor, gazeteci, teknik eleman, sanatçı vb.) ... .. 7		2.8
Subay, astsubay ... .. 4		1.6
Yargıç, savcı, avukat ... .. 3		0.8
Kaymakam, muhtar ... .. 2		0.8
Toplam : Q	250	100.0

Key:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| a) occupations                                | i) teacher  |
| b) number                                     | j) university faculty member  |
| c) percentage                                 | k) minor civil official   |
| d) student                                    | l) member or leader of political party, association, union          |
| intermediate and the like                     | m) free professional (doctor, journalist, technician, artist, etc.) |
| university                                    | n) officer, NCO   |
| advanced school                               | o) judge, prosecutor, attorney                                      |
| training institute                            | p) subgovernor, alderman  |
| e) worker                                     | q) total  |
| f) merchant, industrialist, guild, etc.       |   |
| g) security official (police, guard, private) |   |
| h) passerby                                   |   |

There is rather inadequate information gathered from the press regarding the ideological persuasion of the victims. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw a rough distinction based on reported examples. We can say that in a partial comparison there are different characteristics displayed between the victims whose persuasions were determined out of the 2,300 violent incidents pinpointed in our six research-subject cities and those victims whose persuasion we pinpointed out of the 944 Istanbul incidents. Again, it is noteworthy that the vast majority of the victims were those of leftist persuasions.

#### Political Persuasions of Targets of Violence

##### ŞİDDET OLAYLARININ HEDEF ALDIGI KİMSELERİN SİYASAL EĞİLİMLERİ

a EĞİLİMLER		b BELİRLENEN ALTI KENTTE		c İSTANBUL'DA BELİRLENEN	
f	g	d Sayı	e Oran	d Sayı	e Oran
f Sağ		174	30.8	77	41.8
g Sol		394	69.2	108	58.2
h Toplam		568	100.0	185	100.0

- Key: a) persuasion  
b) reported in the 6 cities  
c) reported in Istanbul  
d) number  
e) percentage  
f) right  
g) left  
h) total

Although it is difficult to generalize with such sketchy data, when the ideological spectrum of targeted individuals in the six cities--including Istanbul--is compared with those of just Istanbul, it is clear that the proportion of rightists increases. We can explain this as the result of stronger organization and intensified ideological clashes in Istanbul. In fact, developments focusing on violence in Istanbul, especially during 1980, reveal an increase in attacks particularly against NAP and RPP provincial and district organization leaders and against municipal assembly members of these two parties. In conjunction, there was an increase in attacks directed against security forces and aldermen.

For example, it is significant that extreme rightists and leftists--beyond settling scores in and around Istanbul--went after notable figures like Nihat Erim, Kemal Turkler, Abdurrahman Koksaloğlu, and İsmail Cerçeksoz. That individuals of various positions and persuasions like Abdi İkepci, Cavit Orhan Tutengil, Umit Doganay, Umit Kaftancıoğlu, and İlhan Darendelioglu have been preyed upon in the past has greatly disturbed urban dwellers. On the other hand, while the number of those killed who were members of civil and military security forces--police and guards constituting the lion's share of these victims--increased to 93 between January and July 1980, it is known that the major portion of these incidents took place in Istanbul.

## The Social Identity of Activists

Incidents of violence usually develop as acts of vengeance involving two ideologically opposed camps. Therefore, it is impossible to make a definite distinction between targets and those initiating the action. Nonetheless, until more detailed research is conducted in future on the socio-economic roots of activists, it is for now useful to offer some information gleaned from official statements in the press and from limited data.

### 1--Their Occupations

The following table reflects occupation distribution based on statements made during the first 2 months after 12 September 1980 by the First Army and Martial Law Command, headquartered in Istanbul, concerning "those involved in anarchic incidents" and who had been arrested.

Occupations of Accused Arrested for Acts of Violence

Şiddet Olayları ile İlgili Olarak Yakalanan Sanıkların Meslekleri			
MESLEKLER a	b SAYI	c ORAN %	
Öğrenci .....	268	16.2	
Yüksek öğrenim öğrencisi 144			d
Orta öğrenim öğrencisi 124			
İşçi .....	579	28.7	
Serbest meslekler .....	443	26.6	
Memur .....	147	8.3	
Hoşla gazer .....	306	18.3	
Ev kadını .....	22	1.4	
Toplam : j	1864	100.0	

Key: a) occupations  
b) number  
c) percentage  
d) student  
    higher education  
    intermediate level  
e) worker  
f) free professional  
g) civil servant  
h) vagrant  
i) housewife  
j) total

Moreover, it is significant that the arrested or sought leadership cadres, announced recently by Martial Law Commands, of such leftist groups as Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Way), Kurtuluş (Liberation), TDKP (Turkish Revolutionary Peasants Party), TKP-ML (Turkish Communist Party-Marxist Leninists), and the like are usually composed of students (61.2 percent society-wide). It appears that almost all (87.0 percent) of these leaders--more than half of whom were university, academy, and advanced school students--dropped out of the schools in which they had been registered and severed all ties with student organizations. Again, it can be said that group leaders whose identities have been disclosed in official Martial Law Command statements have similar characteristics in most cases.

Statements dealing with leaders' identities show that there are not many teachers, free professionals, civil servants, and unemployed although their presence is not unknown. It is noteworthy that unemployment, which we face as a phenomenon peculiar

to major cities, stands out among local activists who are led by cadres that direct the violence. On the other hand, the fact that workers are not present in leadership cadres makes us think that those coming from the ranks of labor are being used more as auxiliaries.

#### Occupations of Extreme Leftist Leaders Arrested or Sought

1981 Ocak-Marti 1981 Yekalenen ve Aramakta olan  
Ekstremist Solcuların Meslekleri

MESLEKLER a	b SAYI	c ORAN %
Öğrenci	60	61.2
Üniversite öğrencisi	33	
Okuldan ve ilköğretim okul	17	
Eğitim enstitüsü	5	
Lise ve dengi okul	5	
Öğretmen	13	13.3
Memur	5	5.1
Mühendis	4	4.1
Yazıcı	4	4.1
Serbest meslekler	3	3.1
Öğretici (özel)	1	1.0
Serbest	1	1.0
Sofist	1	1.0
Diğerler	8	8.1
Toplam	98	100.0

- Key: a) occupations  
b) number  
c) percentage  
d) student  
e) teacher  
f) civil servant  
g) engineer  
h) vagrant  
i) free professional  
j) union member  
k) chauffeur  
l) other  
m) total

(Source: January-February 1981 Press communiques of the Fourth Army Corps and Ankara-Cankiri Provinces Martial Law Command)

When examining the occupations of arrested rightist group leaders we see that nearly all of them have a higher education. In fact, in the 18 February 1981 Fourth Army Corps and Ankara-Cankiri Provinces Martial Law Command statement, one can find among 30 arrested or sought rightist leaders only 3 individuals who dropped out of school. Moreover, most of these individuals, who had definite occupations and who on occasion worked as reporters (for example, nine of them graduated from institutions of higher education like the Agriculture, Forestry, or Language, History, and Geography Faculties, the Gazi Training Institute, or the Galatasaray School of Advanced Engineering and worked at the newspaper HERGUN), were previously managers at the Customs and Monopoly Bank.

Although we cannot make a clear-cut determination of professions with the available limited data, we can say with assurance that in the main there are presently no teachers in the right-wing activist cadres. In any case, another important point when examining rightist and leftist leaders' places of birth is the striking fact that rather few were born in large cities like Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir; the great majority (86.2 percent) were born outside of large cities.

That a rather significant portion (18,3 percent) of those arrested in connection with incidents of violence is "vagrants" is pertinent in demonstrating the important relationship between unemployment and involvement in violence. We believe there is no need to repeat that unemployment, which is one of the characteristics of unsound urbanization that we have stressed, creates an environment highly suited "to gathering activists." In fact, it is surely no coincidence that a decision has been made to send back to their home districts at the first opportunity some 500 vagrants arrested in Istanbul at the close of January 1981.

Nonetheless, sending back individuals who have no jobs or place to live is clearly not a sound and final solution, for the basic problem will not be resolved at the source unless the reasons for unemployment are tackled.

Besides unemployment--an absolute in developing countries--and profound uneasiness among the youth, population explosion and rapid urbanization generate devaluations one after another and incidents of social violence. There are notable striking similarities between these incidents and those of the past. But the Turkey of the 20th century is experiencing a very different "social formation." Is not the duty of scholars essentially to try to demonstrate the inadequacy of legislating against discord and reveal the social reasons for violence.

## 2--Age Groups

Moreover, our observations regarding the age of leadership cadres mentioned above illustrate that most leaders are between 20 and 30, particularly in the 26-30 age group. The number of those less than 20 [is negligible when compared with those] over 30.

### Ages of Extreme Leftist and Extreme Rightist Leaders

#### Uç-Sol ve Uç-Sağ Eylem Örgütleri Liderlerinin Yaş Durumları

Yaş Grupları a	SOL EYLEMCİLER b		SAĞ EYLEMCİLER c	
	Sayı d	Oran (%) e	Sayı	Oran (%)
20'den aşağı f	3	3,1	0	0
21 - 25	35	36,1	3	6,9
26 - 30	36	37,3	8	17,8
30'dan yukarı g	23	23,7	19	43,8
<b>TOPLAM h</b>	<b>97</b>		<b>29</b>	

İ (i) Kaynak: 4. Kolordu ve Ankara - Çankırı Şiddetli Komutanlığı Ocak ve Şubat 1981 basın bildirimleri.

J (ii) Kaynak: Cumhuriyet, 18 Şubat 1981.

- Key: a) age groups  
b) leftists  
c) rightists  
d) number  
e) percentage  
f) below 20  
g) over 30  
h) total

- i) source: January-February 1981 press communique of the Fourth Army Corps and Ankara-Cankiri Martial Law Command  
j) source: Cumhuriyet, 18 February 1981



## Student Dropouts

It can be said that another aspect of the social predicament stems from the difficulties in getting into intermediate and higher education or, in other words, from the continually increasing number of high school graduates in society and, therefore, the manifest uneasiness among youth. In fact, the table, which appeared in the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, regarding requests to pursue higher education and new registrations strikingly illustrates the situation.

Besides this disheartening table, it is known that an average 20,000 students drop out every year. The indicators of this nation-wide crisis could easily multiply. In fact, the cost of living, inflation, and unemployment that we touched on earlier illustrate this general social crisis. It is natural that those who live particularly in major cities feel this crisis even more.

### Those Not Placing in University Entrance Exams

#### Universiteye Giriş Sınavlarında Açıkta Kalanlar

a YILLAR	b LİSEYİ BİTİRENLER	c ÜSYM SINAVINA KATILANLAR	d YÜKSEK ÖĞRETİME YENİ KAYIT	e GİRİŞLİKEN BAŞVURANLARA ORANI
1969-70	40.785	84.183	33.020	31.4
1970-71	43.878	78.540	30.510	38.9
1971-72	48.877	96.867	23.780	24.4
1972-73	54.000	111.801	27.480	24.6
1973-74	61.821	117.822	30.272	25.7
1974-75	80.000	229.894	18.347	26.8
1975-76	88.500	288.273	17.197	18.8
1976-77	110.500	314.341	18.292	16.4
1977-78	126.000	337.311	18.064	14.3
1978-79	170.000	373.884	17.000	9.9

- Key: a) years  
b) high school graduates  
c) those taking the exam given by the University Entrance Examination Placement Center  
d) new registrants pursuing higher education  
e) percentage matriculating vice applicants

### Those Leaving Their Provinces of Birth

Those individuals are in the majority who consider urbanization in the broad sense, as a social manifestation that within the structure of society increases the labor force, specialization, and organization parallel to economic development while generating radical changes in people's world views, value systems, and attitudes. The urbanization process has a demographic aspect that, in short, implies both the numeric increase in a country's population units we call "cities" and their physical expansion.

The rapid urbanization process which our country has pursued since the 1950's is self-evident. The percentage of the population living in cities has risen from 18.7 percent in 1950 to 25.9 percent in 1960, 33.2 percent in 1970, and 44.3 percent

in 1980. The last figure is based on the population living in provincial capitals and district centers. However, if the urban populace is considered as that population living within municipal boundaries, one can conclude that the urbanization level in Turkey has reached 50 percent.

On the other hand, although the national population has increased 2.5 percent a year, the rural population 1.5 percent a year, and the urban population 7 percent a year over the last 30 years, the population increase in major cities has reached a yearly average of 10 percent. It is clear that this rapid increase in major cities has imparted an artificial characteristic to the city through the presence of newly-settled urbanites. This stems only in part from natural population increase. This emigration to the city explains to a degree why there are today some 13 million of our citizens living in urban areas we call "big cities" while less than 3.5 million were doing so in 1960. The populations of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir have each exceeded 1 million. The populations of Adana and Bursa stand at half a million.

It is evident that the population abandoning many of the cities, towns, and villages in Anatolia choose to settle in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir in particular and that these people prefer these cities. For example, it has been determined that of those leaving the provinces of Cankiri and Corum, 40 percent chose Istanbul and 30 percent chose Ankara. Again, according to this research, 76 percent of those preparing to emigrate from these provinces are adamant about these three major cities.

The major flow of emigrants to the west is observed coming from backward areas like the above, from the east, the south, and the Black Sea region. This emigration is not just from eastern villages to major western cities but, at the same time, it is directed at major western cities from eastern cities and towns. For example, a classification according to birthplace of persons living outside their place of birth shows us that--excluding Black Sea provinces--Kastamonu, Cankiri, and Kirsehir lead in producing emigrants.

The continual rise in the proportion of those living outside their province of birth is clear proof of social mobility. The percentage of the population living outside province of birth has climbed from 6.8 percent in 1935, to 10.4 percent in 1955, and 18.8 percent in 1975. One can postulate that it now exceeds 20 percent. As stated before, nearly three-quarters of this "emigrant" population has more often chosen the big cities.

#### Big Cities: Symbol of a "Pirate" Society

Another facet of the problem is that profound differences between urban-rural areas and interregional imbalances in Turkey are now being transmitted to the big cities as part of the urbanization process. The same conflicts are transforming cities into places where new value systems and new attitudinal perspectives are strongly influencing old unidimensional structures. The disparities in culture, education, health, income, and employment between the eastern and western parts of the country now appear focused in the shanty town neighborhoods, on the one hand, and the planned areas of major cities, on the other hand.

Urbanization in Turkey within these parameters is unsound and distorted. Shanty towns that choke the environment of major cities like a "belt of poverty" and a

few million-lira "luxury dwellings" that exist as the result of skewed incomes and disparities are striking proofs of this imbalance. There are significant difficulties in checking, on the one hand, rising unemployment and, on the other hand, stimulated consumer tendencies in an environment where public services are not available to everyone, city property is not used for the public good, and speculation and the quick sell are ubiquitous.

So it is that our big cities do not symbolize centers of civilization in which the general rules of behavior that all cities recognize and adhere to are in effect but, on the contrary, a "pirate society" in which, as it were, the laws of the jungle are applied. Meanwhile, some of them turn the corner while some go on being tormented.

[8 Apr 81, p 8]

[Text]

### III

Violence is not peculiar to downtown Istanbul. Such activity is evident in surrounding areas although these areas are divided into separate districts for administrative purposes. However, we believe it is not coincidental that violence is virtually nonexistent in predominantly rural districts like Silivri, Sile, Yalova, and Catalca as well as in a uniquely located district like the Marmara islands (situated at varying distances from the city), whose residents are generally in the upper income brackets. It is clear that violence ought to be analyzed within the intimate web of relations between city and outlying districts.

In fact, our general observations about Istanbul reveal that the characteristics of violence on the whole differ somewhat from district to district. Let us, however, quickly point out that most of the violence reported in the press between 1975 and 1979 took place in the districts of Fatih, Sisli, and Kadikoy. Eminonu, Kartal, Besiktas, Eyup, Bakirkoy, and Uskudar follow in turn. On the other hand, we have determined that the number of incidents is rather small in partially urbanized areas such as Yalova, Silivri, Sile, and Catalca.

It is interesting that in areas where the rate of shanty town construction is generally high--as in Beykoz, Zeytinburnu, Eyup, Kartal, and Gaziosmanpasa--but in which there is also a high concentration of factory workers, the proportion of violence is not high. Yet, it can be said that urban tension and factionalism are pronounced in the central districts of Eminonu, Fatih, and Sisli, where persons of "all sectors" reside and where educational institutions of various levels are concentrated. In fact, the lower frequency of violence in districts like Gaziosmanpasa, Zeytinburnu, Beykoz, and Eyup, where it has been determined that Istanbul's low-income families generally live, can ultimately be attributed to the relative homogeneity of these districts' social structure. Conversely, it is significant that violence reaches its highest levels in districts like Eminonu, Fatih, Kadikoy, and, especially, Sisli, where urbanization has disrupted the social structure and exacerbated social distinctions.

But this does not mean that incidents of violence do not occur in low-income and homogenous districts. It should not be forgotten that more than 15 percent of all violence in Istanbul occurred in Eyup, Gaziosmanpasa, Bakirkoy, Beykoz, and Zeytinburnu. We believe it is clear that the impact of skewed income distribution on this metropolis cannot be ignored in this regard. As a matter of fact, research

on income distribution conducted by the Istanbul Urban Planning Project using the results of the Istanbul Transportation Institute, shows that these districts have the highest proportion of low-income families and the lowest proportion of high-income families in the city. The following table arranges districts from the standpoint of income distribution according to the results of this study.

Income Distribution Within Istanbul's Central Districts (1973)

Istanbul Merkez İlçelerinde  
Gelir Dağılımı, 1973

İlçeler a	En düşük gelir grubundaki b	En yüksek gelir grubundaki c	Kiddes olayı d yüzdesi
	altında oranı (0-400 TL.)	altında oranı (5000 TL./den çok) e	
Sisli	18.5	7.0	17.0
Fatih	23.1	4.0	18.3
Kadiköy	16.1	9.0	12.8
Eminönü	20.0	3.0	10.4
Besiktas	15.0	10.5	6.1
Üsküdar	19.9	3.3	4.7
Osmanbey	22.7	0.3	1.0
Zeytinburnu	43.7	0.3	3.0
Beykoz	36.3	0.3	1.5
Bakırköy	22.8	0.1	0.2
Kydp	30.2	0.2	0.5
Kartal	19.0	1.4	0.3
Beşiktaş	16.4	3.9	1.5
Karşıyaka	34.3	1.3	1.5

Key: a) districts  
b) percentage of low-income families  
c) percentage of high-income families  
d) percentage of violence  
e) more than 5000TL

Source: S. Ozmucur, "Distribution of Income in Istanbul," Istanbul Urban Planning Project, Technical Memorandum 197, Jan 1975. (Silivri, Sile, Yalova, and Catalca are not included in the table.)

In commenting on this table we must point out for the sake of accuracy that districts like Eminonu, Fatih, Sisli, Kadikoy, and Besiktas also have a large number of training and educational facilities and a rather high population density. All are labor and employment centers for Istanbul. When these characteristics are added to the internal differentiation clearly evident from the standpoint of income and social services, it is hardly surprising that violence peaks in these districts.

On the other hand, while an analysis of where violence takes place in these districts gives us new clues, it also invalidates some prejudgements. While an analysis of violence by place of commission is suitable for pinpointing the general distribution of these incidents in Turkey, it reveals some differences within Istanbul's districts. These differences stem from the districts' structural characteristics.

Actually, the primary data in the above table reflects the varying structure of Istanbul from district to district. Nonetheless, it is quite striking that in a district like Zeytinburnu, which has a great many industrial workers and where there



is a concentration of businesses, violence occurs particularly in residences and coffeehouses, not factories. It is interesting that in an area like Kartal, which is further removed from the city center--although structurally similar to it--the vast majority of incidents take place in the streets or in businesses. However, there are no incidents of violence in factories. The situation in Bakirkoy, Zeytinburnu's neighbor district, is much different than in Kartal.

The findings of our work encompassing 1975 through 1979 bear out our observations when one compares murders and injuries reported in the press during the summer of 1980, when terrorism peaked in our city, with a numeric breakdown of incidents per district. Incidents of violence are concentrated in Istanbul districts whose socio-economic structures are the most complex and which clearly show indications of unsound urbanization.

The attached map demonstrates this situation by becoming darker toward the city center. The map shows that the districts, whose structures we defined above, have the highest proportion of the 204 killings and injuries that occurred in Istanbul prior to the coup during a 3 month 10 day period between 1 June and 10 September. Districts like Sisli and Bakirkoy are the most striking examples. But it must be stated that it would be a mistake to think that the killings and injuries concentrated in these and similar districts took place in the old sections of these districts. In Bakirkoy, for example, these incidents are concentrated in the new outer quarters like Esenler, Kocasinan, Sefakoy, Avcilar, Kanarya, Haznedar, Yenibosna, and Sirinevler, where those coming to the city from outside Istanbul and Turkey live in "mini-communities" that before long become enemies. There is no thought of integrating with the city at large. This shows us that incidents of violence are not peculiar to communities like Atakoy and Yesilkoy that are markedly affluent or those like Catalca, Silivri, Sili, and Yalova that have a homogenous rural structure and are a distance from the city.

Cannot political violence then be regarded as a concrete indicator that people coming from outside the region and even outside the country to Istanbul, where new and old communities are in conflict, remain unable to integrate with the metropolis? This would at the same time bolster our view that incidents of violence are removed from the factories.


Our analysis of Bakirkoy can be regarded as valid for Sisli. Locales in this complexly structured district like Mecidiyekoy, Cagalyan, Celiktepe, Sanayi, Kustepe, Dolapdere, Gultepe, and Ornektepe, where killings and injuries were concentrated between June and September 1980 became battlefields in which extreme rightists and leftists carried on a limited warfare. Our findings, as stated earlier, reveal that violence and terrorism spread from Istanbul's center to the outlying districts. This gradually expanding belt of violence once again points to the important problems of unemployment, housing, education, and cultural integration.

#### Conclusion

We can say that through this series, within which we have included some Istanbul findings and our personal assessments that comprise part of more comprehensive work conducted on the city and violence, we have largely proven our major premise. Unsound urbanization is turning the country into a breeding ground for violence. While this is not the sole source of violence, it clearly facilitates its emergence.

Yet, our cities are the focal points of the Turkish society of the future. As such, Istanbul today, with all its positive and negative aspects, is a microcosm of Turkey and an important social research laboratory. It is an inescapable necessity that this country's leaders not simply be content with rejuvenating state authority but place emphasis on the socio-economic conditions that promote integration. Concentration should be placed on rapidly implementing a "comprehensive strategy" to combat political violence in Italy, where political terrorism has reached greater dimensions than in any other European country, excluding Turkey. In fact, the words of General Cappuzzo, head of the Carabinieri, the leading security force in the war against terrorism, are significant: "There are youths who reject democracy. These individuals may or may not be won over by the system. Their conversion may be accomplished not with force or violence--these being contrary to the heart of the system--but through the creation of a new culture model." General Cappuzzo is convinced that the best answer to terrorism is not an expanded penal system but the successful implementation of political and social policies. As a matter of fact, although we propose seeking a partial solution to violence by eliminating distortions in the social system and, in this connection, unsound urbanization, we have also made it clear that we share the "comprehensive strategy" viewpoint.





Map

Istanbul, home to 12 percent of Turkey's populace, was the stage for 29 percent of all incidents of political terrorism. Bombing and armed assault constituted the vast majority of these incidents. Robbery took second place. The distribution of terrorist incidents within Istanbul's districts presents an interesting picture. Bakirkoy and Sisli were staging grounds for most of the 204 incidents that took place in Istanbul during the sample period of June-September 1980. There were more than 39 incidents in both these districts during this period. In second place with 12-20 incidents apiece were the districts of Beyoglu, Kadikoy, Eminonu, and Fatih. Following these were Besiktas, Kartal, and Uskudar with 7-11 incidents apiece. In the 4-month period prior to 12 September, Sariyer, Eyup, Beykoz, Gaziosmanpasa, and Catalca registered 1-6 incidents apiece. There were only three completely "clean" Istanbul districts in which there were no incidents of terrorism: Silivri, Sile, and Yalova.

Location of Violent Incidents in Istanbul by District

İstanbul'un İlçelerine Göre, Şiddet Olaylarının Yerleri: 1975 - 1979															
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p
İlçeler	Sokak	İşyeri	Üniv.	Banka	Konut	Parti	Kahve	Okul	Resmî	Yapı	Taşıt	Eğ. yerl	Kır	Fabrika	Yabancı Ülke Tem. Cami
Adalar									1						
Bakırköy	23	3		7	3	6		3	3	1					
Beşiktaş	20	6	13	3	7	4	3		1		1				
Beykoz	5	1	1		1	1	1	2					1		
Bayoğlu	6	5	5	4	2	1		1							
Eminönü	33	6	25	10	1	6	3	3	5	4					3
Eyüp	20	7	1	1	5	4	8	2	1		1	1	1		
Fatih	77	24	14	11	7	8	9	5	9	1	5		1		
G. Osmanpaşa	9	2		1		2		1	1						
Kadıköy	42	18	11	14	13	6	3	5	3	4		1			1
Sarıyer	9	2			2					1					
Şişli	77	25	21	17	8	6	8	1	1	1	3		1		
Üsküdar	17	9	1	3	2	3	2	3	3		1				
Zeytinburnu		4			18	3	6	2			3	1			
Cataca	8	2					2								
Kartal	24	12		5	5	6	2	1		2			2		
Silivri		1													
Sile													1		
Yalova	1	1												1	
	372	126	92	78	74	56	49	29	28	18	11	5	4	3	1

- Key:
- a) districts
  - b) street
  - c) business
  - d) university
  - e) bank
  - f) residence
  - g) political party
  - h) coffeehouse
  - i) school
  - j) official building
  - k) transportation
  - l) place of entertainment
  - m) rural
  - n) factory
  - o) foreign representation
  - p) mosque

Distribution of Violence in Istanbul Districts (by Type of Incident)

Şiddet Olaylarının İstanbul İlçelerine Dağılışı 1975-79 (Olay türüne göre)												
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	
İlçeler	Silahlı Hırsızlık	Soygun	Silahlı Çatışma	Direnis, Boycot, Yan- Miting	Yan- gün	Taşlı, Sopalı Kavala	Kaç- ma	Gemi Ka- çırma	Adam Kaçırma	Tehdit, Zorla para alma	Toplam	%
Adalar	1										1	0.1
Bakırköy	35	9	2	1	2						49	5.2
Beşiktaş	34	8	11	8	1				1		58	6.1
Beşiktaş	12		1		1						14	1.3
Beyoğlu	14	3	2	3		2					24	2.5
Emirhan	54	16	10	8	2	7					98	10.4
Eyüp	46	3	1		1	1					52	5.5
Fatih	120	24	13	7	3	2	2		1		172	18.2
G.Osmanpaşa	15	2	1								18	1.9
Kadıköy	67	23	10	9	5	2		1		2	119	12.6
Karıyer	10	1			3						14	1.5
Sisli	104	29	22	7	3	3					169	17.9
Üsküdar	36	8	8	1	1	2	2	1			44	4.7
Zeytinburnu	28	8	8	3							37	3.9
Çatalca	10	1	1								12	1.3
Kartal	43	10	2	1	2						58	6.3
Silivri											1	0.1
Sile												
Yalova	1	2									3	0.3
Toplam	1	621	127	97	25	19	4	2	2	2	944	100.0

- Key:
- a) districts
  - b) bombing, armed assault
  - c) robbery
  - d) armed clash
  - e) active resistance, boycott, rally
  - f) arson
  - g) rock, club fight
  - h) prison incident, escape, riot
  - i) shipjacking
  - j) kidnapping
  - k) blackmail, extortion
  - l) total

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